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ARTICLE

Successor Liability
in Tennessee
By George W. Kuney

S

uccessor liability is an
exception to the general rule
that, when one corporate or
other juridical person sells
assets to another entity, the
assets are transferred free
and clear of all but valid liens and security interests. When successor liability is
imposed, a creditor or plaintiff with a
claim against the seller may assert that
claim against and collect payment from
the purchaser.
Historically, successor liability was a
flexible doctrine, designed to eliminate
the harsh results that could attend strict
application of corporate law. Over time,
however, as successor liability doctrines
evolved, they became, in many jurisdictions, ossified and lacking in flexibility.
As this occurred, corporate lawyers and
those who structure transactions
learned how to avoid application of
successor liability doctrines.1 This
article summarizes what has become of
various species of non-statutory
successor liability in Tennessee.2
There are two broad groups of
successor liability doctrines, those that
are judge-made (the “common law”
exceptions) and those that are creatures of statute. Both represent a
distinct public policy that, in certain
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instances and for certain liabilities, the
general rule of non-liability of a
successor for a predecessor’s debts
following an asset sale should not
apply. This article addresses the status
of the first group, judge-made successor
liability in Tennessee.
The current judge-made successor
liability law is a product of the rise of
corporate law in the last half of the 19th
century and early part of the 20th
century. It appears to have developed
because of and in reaction to the rise of
corporate law. It may be better to characterize it as a part of that body of law,
much like the “alter ego” or “piercing
the corporate veil” doctrines,3 rather
than as a creature of tort law, although it
is used as a tool by plaintiffs who are
involuntary tort claimants.
Many sources and authorities list
four, five or six basic types of situations
in which judge-made successor liability
has sometimes been recognized — (1)
express or implied assumption, (2)
fraud, (3) de facto merger, (4) mere
continuation, (5) continuity of enterprise, and (6) product line, for example.4
In fact, the matter is more complicated
than that. Each of these species of
successor liability has, within it,
different sub-species with different stan-

dards and variations in the jurisdictions
that recognize them. Some use a list of
mandatory elements while others are
based on a non-exclusive list of factors
and considerations to be weighed and
balanced in a “totality of the circumstances” fashion. Some that began as an
approach consisting of a flexible list of
factors have evolved into one consisting
of one or more mandatory elements. In
any event, to state that there are only
four, five or six categories is to oversimplify the matter.5

The state of successor
liability in Tennessee
When examined in detail, the types
of successor liability can be classified
into five general species, each of which
is specifically defined on a jurisdictionby-jurisdiction basis. The five categories
of successor liability discussed in this
article are: (1) intentional assumptions
of liabilities, (2) fraudulent schemes to
escape liability, (3) de facto mergers, (4)
the continuity exceptions: mere continuation and continuity of enterprise, and
(5) the product line exception.
When examining successor liability,
one should keep in mind that there are
variance and overlap among the species
and their formulation in particular juris-
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dictions. The label a court uses for its
test is not necessarily one with a standardized meaning applicable across
jurisdictions. Accordingly, it is
dangerous to place too much reliance on
a name; the underlying substance should
always be examined.
A. Intentional (express or implied)
assumption of liabilities
Intentional assumption of liabilities,
express or implied, is probably the
simplest of the successor liability species.
Imposing liability on a successor that by
its actions is shown to have assumed
liabilities is essentially an exercise in the
realm of contract law, drawing on
doctrines of construction and the objective theory of contract.6
At least in the contracts context, the
Tennessee Court of Appeals has applied
the traditional rule of successor liability,
allowing for the four traditional exceptions.7 Tennessee has not, however,
outlined a test for the “intentional
assumption of liabilities” exception.
B. Fraudulent schemes to
escape liability
The next species of successor liability
is the doctrine based on fraud. Fraudulent schemes to escape liability by using
corporate law limitation-of-liability
principles to defeat the legitimate interests of creditors illustrate an example of
the need for successor liability to prevent
injustice. If a corporation’s equity
holders, for example, arrange for the
company’s assets to be sold to a new
company in which they also hold an
equity or other stake for less value than
would be produced if the assets were
deployed by the original company in the
ordinary course of business, then the
legitimate interests and expectations of
the company’s creditors have been frustrated.8 By allowing liability to attach to
the successor corporation in such
instances, the creditors’ interests and
expectations are respected. The challenge, of course, is defining the standard
that separates the fraudulent scheme
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from the legitimate one.
Tennessee courts do not appear to
have addressed the fraud exception in
any reported opinions.
C. De facto merger
In a statutory merger, the successor
corporation becomes liable for the
predecessor’s debts.9 The de facto merger
species of successor liability creates the
same result in the asset sale context to
avoid allowing form to overcome
substance. A de facto merger, then,
allows liability to attach when an asset
sale has mimicked the results of a statutory merger except for the continuity of
liability. The main difference between
the sub-species of de facto merger and
various jurisdictions is how rigid or flexible the test is. In other words, how
many required elements must be shown
to establish applicability of the doctrine?
On one end of the spectrum is the
lengthy, mandatory checklist of required
elements. On the other, the non-exclusive list of factors is to be weighed in a
totality of the circumstances fashion.
Tennessee courts do not appear to
have addressed the de factor merger
doctrine in a reported decision.
D. Continuation of the business:
the continuity exceptions
An exception with two distinct
subcategories permits successor liability
when the successor continues the business of the seller: mere continuation and
continuity of enterprise. Each has subspecies particular to specific jurisdictions
within them. The two share roughly the
same indications but continuity of enterprise does not require continuity of
shareholders or directors or officers
between the predecessor and the
successor — a requirement said to be one
of the mere continuation exception’s
dispositive elements or factors.10 Courts
are not altogether careful or uniform in
labeling which exception they are
applying. There appear to be four
general sup-species of mere continuation
and three of continuity of enterprise.

The similarity of these doctrines to those
of de facto merger is striking.11
Mere Continuation. In applying the
mere continuation exception the court
noted that “one federal district court
has opined that” [t]he gravamen of the
“mere continuation” exception is the
continuation of corporate control and
ownership, rather than continuation of
business operations. “Many courts have
likewise concluded that the key inquiry
in resolving this issue is whether there
exists a continuation of the corporate
entity. We agree.” 12
Tennessee has not addressed the
“mere continuation” doctrine with
respect to successor liability.
The two species of continuity of
enterprise. Unlike the more traditional
and long-standing mere continuation
exception, the continuity of enterprise
theory does not require strict continuity
of shareholders or owners (and possibly
directors and officers) between the predecessor and the successor — although
the degree or extent of continuity of
owners, directors and officers is a
factor.13 Further, continuity of enterprise
generally does not include the requirement of dissolution of the predecessor
upon or soon after the sale, which is
often a factor — and sometimes a
requirement — in jurisdictions applying
the mere continuation doctrine.14
A detailed examination of continuity of enterprise in the jurisdictions
that have adopted it discloses three
sub-species at work. All the variations
of the continuity of enterprise exception derive from Turner v. Bituminous
Cas. Co.15 Variations in the application
of the Turner factors create the three
sub-species.
In Turner, the Michigan Supreme
Court expanded the four traditional
categories of successor liability, and in so
doing, developed a continuity of enterprise theory of successor liability.16 The
court adopted the rule that, in the sale
(Continued on page 26)
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Successor liability
(Continued from page 25)

of corporate assets for cash, three criteria
would be the threshold guidelines to
establish whether there is continuity of
enterprise between the transferee and
the transferor corporations.
(1) There is a continuation of the
enterprise of the seller corporation, so
that there is a continuity of management, personnel, physical location,
assets, and general business operations;
(2) The seller corporation ceases its
ordinary business operations, liquidates, and dissolves as soon as legally
and practically possible; and
(3) The purchasing corporation
assumes those liabilities and obligations of the seller ordinarily necessary
for the interrupted continuation of
normal business operations of the
seller corporation.17
The Michigan Supreme Court did not
address the limits of the continuity of
enterprise exception again until 1999 in
Foster v. Cone-Blanchard Mach. Co.18 In
Foster, a plaintiff, injured while operating
a feed screw machine, sued the corporate
successor after receiving a $500,000
settlement from the predecessor corporation.19 The court held that “because [the]
predecessor was available for recourse as
witnessed by plaintiff’s negotiated settlement with the predecessor for $500,000,
the continuity of enterprise theory of
successor liability is inapplicable.”20
The Foster court thus resolved two
issues left open in Turner. First, the
Michigan appellate decisions prior to
Foster cited Turner for the proposition
that the continuity of enterprise test
was comprised of four elements or
factors, following the four items
enumerated in the Turner court’s
holding and not the three listed in its
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announcement of the rule.21 The Foster
court clarified that, in fact, only three
items are involved in the Turner rule,
and they are required elements.22
Second, the Foster court held that the
“‘continuity of enterprise’ doctrine applies
only when the transferor is no longer
viable and capable of being sued.”23 The
court’s interpretation of the underlying
rationale of Turner was “to provide a
source of recovery for injured plaintiffs.”24
According to Justice Brickley, the Turner
court expanded liability based on the
successor’s continued enjoyment of
“certain continuing benefits”: “[T]he test
in Turner is designed to determine
whether the company (or enterprise)
involved in the lawsuit is essentially the
same company that was allegedly negligent in designing or manufacturing the
offending product.”25
The Foster decision thus appears to
return Michigan law to its state immediately after Turner was decided: continuity
of enterprise is a recognized doctrine of
successor liability and the doctrine has
three required elements. To the extent
that intervening decisions had narrowed
Turner with the addition of a fourth factor
— whether the purchasing corporation
holds itself out to the world as the effective continuation of the seller
corporation — that revision of the
doctrine appears to have been reversed.
Further, to the extent that Turner’s
“guidelines” had been considered factors
by other courts adopting the continuity of
enterprise, the Foster court made it clear
that it interpreted its own rule as one
comprised of elements.
Tennessee does not appear to recognize the “continuity of enterprise”
doctrine.
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E. The product line exception of
Ray v. Alad
In Ray v. Alad,26 the California
Supreme Court recognized the product
line exception to the general rule of
successor non-liability. It is a species of
liability that is very similar to continuity
of enterprise. The court articulated the
following “justifications” for imposing
liability on a successor corporation:
(1) the virtual destruction of the
plaintiff’s remedies against the original
manufacturer caused by the successor’s
acquisition of the business, (2) the
successor’s ability to assume the original manufacturer’s risk spreading role,
and (3) the fairness of requiring the
successor to assume a responsibility for
defective products that was a burden
necessarily attached to the original
manufacturer’s goodwill being enjoyed
by the successor in the continued
operation of the business.27
The term “justifications” is somewhat
ambiguous as to whether it connotes
required elements or non-exclusive
factors to be balanced, much like the
Turner guidelines.
Like the Michigan Supreme Court in
Foster, which revisited Turner some years
after the original opinion was issued, the
California Supreme Court returned to
Ray v. Alad some years later to “clarify”
things. In Henkel Corp. v. Hartford Acc.
& Indemn. Co.,28 the California Supreme
Court referred to these three justifications as conditions, thus suggesting that
they were essential elements under the
product line exception. Despite its name,
the product line theory of successor
liability appears only rarely, if at all, to
have been applied in a reported decision
to a successor that had acquired merely
one of many product lines from the predecessor; in nearly all reported cases, it
appears to have been applied to sales of
substantially all of a predecessor’s assets.29
In fact, one court has emphasized that the
“policy justifications for our adopting the
product line rule require the transfer of
substantially all of the predecessor’s assets
to the successor corporation.”30
The product line doctrine, where
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accepted, breaks into two distinct subspecies. The two differ only as to whether
Ray’s “virtual destruction of the plaintiff’s
[other] remedies” condition is strictly
required in order to permit recovery.
Tennessee has not yet addressed the
issue of successor liability in the products
liability arena, and therefore has not
considered successor liability as it relates
to strict tort liability.

Conclusion
This article and its more detailed
companion pieces in the Florida State
University Business Review and on the
author’s Web site attempt to detail some
of the history and the current condition
of successor liability law in Tennessee.
The purpose of the doctrines was to
provide contract and tort creditors with
an avenue of recovery against a successor
entity in appropriate cases when the predecessor that contracted with them or
committed the tort or the action that
later gave rise to the tort had sold
substantially all of its assets and was no
longer a viable source of recovery. Its
various species acted as a pressure relief
valve on the strict limitation of liability
created by corporate law. The doctrine is
in the nature of an “equitable” doctrine
insofar as it is invoked when strict application of corporate law would offend the
conscience of the court. In large part, the
doctrine remains intact and still serves
that purpose.
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